1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Remedies by Quigley, Mark R.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 2 Article 22
Spring 1998
1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases:
Remedies
Mark R. Quigley
Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
This Survey of Rhode Island Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Quigley, Mark R. (1998) "1997 Survey of Rhode Island Law: Cases: Remedies," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 3: Iss. 2,
Article 22.
Available at: http://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol3/iss2/22
552 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3:387
Remedies. LaPlante v. Honda North America, Inc., 697 A.2d 625
(R.I. 1997). Under section 9-1-50 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, a plaintiff who does not receive a settlement payment within
thirty days of the settlement date has a cause of action for punitive
damages and interest on the punitive damages award, but not in-
terest on the settlement amount.
Section 9-1-50 of the Rhode Island General Laws provides
plaintiffs remedies when a defendant does not pay the agreed set-
tlement within thirty days.' The statute, however, "is not a model
of statutory clarity."2 The court, applying the rules of statutory
construction,3 held that the statute entitles the plaintiff to a cause
of action for punitive damages and interest on the punitive dam-
ages award, but not interest on the original settlement amount. 4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Arthur LaPlante (LaPlante) was seriously injured while oper-
ating an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on March 11, 1989. 5 LaPlante
brought a products-liability action and other claims against Honda
R&D Co., Ltd., Honda Motor Co., Ltd. and American Honda Motor
Co., Inc. (collectively Honda) in the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island.6 In 1993, a jury awarded
LaPlante $8,204,200. 7 The judgment was reversed in 1994 on the
1. Section 9-1-50 of the Rhode Island General Laws (1956) (1997 Reenact-
ment) provides in part:
Whenever any claim is settled, the insurance company, adjusting com-
pany, or any other person, firm, or corporation responsible for paying the
settlement shall make payment within thirty (30) days from the date the
claimant or his or her attorney sends the release. Failure to make pay-
ment within thirty (30) days shall raise a presumption that failure to do
so was a willful and wanton disregard for the rights of the claimant. In
addition to all other remedies, the payor shall be liable to the claimant in
a separate cause of action for punitive damages and interest which shall
be computed at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date
the cause of action giving rise to the settlement occurred until the judg-
ment on the claim brought pursuant to this section is entered.
Id.
2. LaPlante v. Honda N. Am., 697 A.2d 625, 628 (R.. 1997).
3. See id.
4. See id. at 629.
5. See LaPlante, 27 F.3d at 734. (stating that LaPlante's neck was broken
and he was rendered quadriplegic.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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grounds of improper jury instructions.8 A negotiated settlement of
LaPlante's claim was eventually reached, with LaPlante executing
a release on January 19, 1995 in exchange for Honda's promise to
pay $600,000.9 Payment was not received until thirty-four days
after the execution of the release. 10
LaPlante filed a complaint in Rhode Island Superior Court, al-
leging a violation of section 9-1-50 of the Rhode Island General
Laws." LaPlante sought punitive damages and interest calcu-
lated at twelve percent on the settlement amount from the date of
the occurrence leading to the settlement, 12 approximately
$576,000 in interest. 13 The case was removed to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island based on diverse
citizenship.14
The matter was initially referred to a magistrate for "prelimi-
nary review, findings and recommended disposition."15 The magis-
trate concluded that the statute did not permit recovery of interest
on the original settlement amount, but merely permitted a cause of
action for punitive damages and interest thereon.16 The issue then
came before the United States district court, which prepared a cer-
tified question for the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 17 The ques-
tion was: "[dloes Rhode Island General Law § 9-1-50 provide for
the recovery of compensatory interest based upon the unpaid set-
tlement amount independent of a possible recovery of punitive
damages for wilful or wanton conduct?"' 8
BACKGROUND
Article I, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure provides that the court "may answer questions of law certi-
fied to it by ... a United States District Court when requested."19
8. See id. at 737.




13. See id. at 629.




18. Id. at 626.
19. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P., art. I, R. 6.
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When a statute is ambiguous, it is the task of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court to serve as the "final arbiter" on the meaning of the
statute.20 "In order to accomplish this task, [the court] must apply
the frequently recited rules of statutory construction."21 First, the
court attempts to "ascertain the intention of a legislative body from
a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind its nature,
object, language and arrangement." 22 Secondly, the court gener-
ally presumes that the legislature "intended every word of the en-
actment to have a useful purpose and to have some force and
effect."23 Finally, the court attempts to avoid an "absurd or unjust
result."24
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The court first commended the United States magistrate for
his rejection of Honda's attempt to introduce affidavits of legisla-
tors who sponsored the bill in 1991.25 It noted that such "post hoc
affidavits... are not true legislative histories and should be given
no weight."26
Turning to the statutory language, the court observed that the
term "settlement amount" is not included in the statute. 27 The
court found it unlikely that the General Assembly would have in-
tended interest to be calculated on the settlement amount without
the use of that phrase.28
The justices next observed that the statute creates a "cause of
action."29 It held that the use of the singular "cause" versus the
plural "causes" evidenced the legislature's intent to create a single
claim for punitive damages with interest, and not include a second
claim for compensatory interest computed on the settlement
amount.30 The court then noticed the proximity of the words "pu-
20. LaPlante, 697 A.2d at 628 (citations omitted).
21. Rhode Island State Police Lodge No. 25 v. State, 485 A.2d 1245, 1247 (R.I.
1984).
22. Algiere v. Fox, 404 A.2d 72, 74 (R.I. 1979).
23. Defenders of Animals v. Dep't of Envtl. Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543
(R.I. 1989).
24. LaPlante, 697 A.2d at 628.
25. See id. at 628-29.




30. Id. at 628.
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nitive damages" and "interest."31 It found that the term "interest"
was meant solely to modify the "punitive damages" phrase. 32
Finally, the court reasoned that to find otherwise would result
in an "absurd or unjust result."33 Honda was four days late in de-
livering payment. 34 Under LaPlante's interpretation of the stat-
ute, this minor delay would make Honda liable for $576,000 in
damages.35 This result would be "both extreme and unjust."36
CONCLUSION
In LaPlante, the Rhode Island Supreme Court exercised its
function as the final arbiter of statutory meaning. The court ap-
plied the standard rules of statutory construction to the ambiguous
statute providing a remedy for settlement payments not received
within thirty days of the settlement date. The court determined
that the statute provides the plaintiff with a cause of action for
punitive damages with interest, but does not provide for interest
on the original settlement amount.
Mark R. Quigley
31. Id. at 629.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.
